Boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games
I. Nature of the Cold War in the 1970s
a. Common fear of nuclear warfare unites Brezhnev with U.S. leaders
i. 1969 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks begin in Helsinki, Finland
ii. 1972 SALT I signed by Brezhnev and Nixon, the epitome of détente
iii. 1974 Summit in Vladivostok with Brezhnev and Ford
iv. 1975 international summit in Helsinki
v. 1979 SALT II signed by Brezhnev and Carter in Vienna
b. Yet a climate of distrust constantly threatens détente
i. 1973 ceasefire in Vietnam, leading to North Vietnamese takeover in 1975
ii. President Nixon’s resignation in 1974
1. A question of U.S. dominance and reliability, especially considering events in Vietnam
c. Toppling of détente under Carter and Brezhnev
i. Carter’s human rights agenda – should trade relations depend on human rights progress?
ii. At home, Carter viewed as soft on Communist expansion
iii. 1979 Shah of Iran overthrown, initiating the Iran Hostage Crisis
iv. December 1979 USSR sends troops to Afghanistan, an unacceptable act of aggression
1. A “brief” turned extended conflict
II. Afghanistan: The End of Détente
a. Carter forcefully pressures Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
i. Recalls US ambassador from Moscow
ii. Asks Senate to hold consideration of SALT II
iii. Cuts trade, embargo on grain sales
iv. Military assistance to Pakistan
v. January 4, 1980 Carter suggests boycotting the Olympics…
III. The Decision: Boycotting the 1980 Olympics
a. Americans view Moscow as an unsuitable location for the Olympics
b. Newscasters and sports columnists lend their support from the media
c. January 20, 1980, Carter’s ultimatum: USSR has one month to withdraw
i. U.S. House of Representatives approves the decision; 386 in favor, 12 opposed. U.S. Senate follows; 88 in favor, 4 opposed
d. USOC makes the final decision to boycott
i. Initially hesitant, committee respects public’s approval
ii. Carter urges USOC to ask IOC to move the site
e. International Olympic Committee responds
i. Deem it “legally and technically impossible” to move location
IV. International Boycott Efforts
a. Resounding support does not come easily
b. Muhammad Ali sent to Africa to recruit support, an unconvincing representative
c. Canada, West Germany, Norway, Chile, Japan, Turkey and China join the boycott
d. Great Britain and Australia support the boycott, yet send athletes
e. IOC encourages participation; France, Italy, Spain, India and New Zealand attend
f. Overall, 62 nations joined the boycott, and 81 nations participated
V. Carter’s Intentions and Impact
a. Aimed to defend human rights and protect U.S. security
i. Decisive action after Tehran was necessary
b. Hoped boycott might be auspicious for reelection
i. Public opinion backed Carter, yet this did not lead to reelection
c. International impact was minimal - no Soviet withdrawal, did not receive overwhelming support from allies
d. Individual athletes were devastated, yet remained patriotic and supportive citizens
i. Jane Frederick: “I must accept the inescapable conclusion: I am a pawn.”
ii. Craig Virgin: “I may forgive, but I’ll never forget.”
e. American businesses and television networks suffered; Carter embargoes all Olympic exports
f. Minimal disruption to the Moscow games; medals still awarded, cameras masked the impact, and USSR retaliates by boycotting LA games in 1984
g. Critics view Carter as undermining the spirit of the Olympics
VI. Assessing the Threat
a. Boycott as a final blow to détente, one missed opportunity in a history of “lost opportunities” (Leffler)
b. American and Soviet leaders both miscalculated the threat of the enemy
c. Yet the threat felt real and imminent - not on the scale of WWII, but Americans were willing to make sacrifices in the fight against Communism
d. Fear, and a legacy of war, dictated Cold War policy, making détente an unsustainable arrangement
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