Boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games
Decades after the Second World War, a fear of modern warfare lingered among American and Soviet leaders alike. Those who understood the devastation of the atomic bomb, the plundering by Nazi forces, and the general destruction of human life felt a
powerful obligation to avoid war at all costs. The specter of science and nuclear energy loomed as a potential for immense evil, and the imminent notion of MAD, mutually assured destruction, remained strong. Thus, the 1970s ushered in the engagement of
a policy of détente. While the superpowers acknowledged philosophical differences, American and Soviet leaders aimed to compete peacefully. Cooperation would yield mutual benefits, as the goals of détente included equal security, strategic parity, and reciprocal economic gains. As then President Richard Nixon remarked to Leonid Brezhnev, leader of the Soviet state for eighteen years, in 1972, “Let’s leave systems aside, and let’s talk about how to improve our relationship.” An all-consuming fear of nuclear destruction, and a consequent commitment to peace, united Nixon and Brezhnev.
A Legacy of Fear: Commitment to Peace
While Jimmy Carter entered the presidency with little experience in foreign policy, his intention to serve as the world’s champion for human rights was clear. As Leffler observes, American democracy as a beacon of human rights was the central theme of Carter’s diplomacy. Addressing the Cold War, Carter announced his intention to move forward with a policy of cooperation; he wanted to continue dialogue on SALT II, work toward the banning of nuclear tests, and focus on reducing arms. In his first letter to Brezhnev, written in January of 1977, Carter enumerated his intentions of peace:
“We represent different social systems, and our countries differ from each other in their history and experience…Yet this must not interfere with
common efforts towards formation of a more peaceful, just, and humane world…I hope that our countries can cooperate more closely.”
In an address to Congress in January of 1980, Carter deemed the Soviet invasion, “the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War.” As long as Soviet troops remained in the territory, détente was impossible. Although Carter had accepted the advancement of socialist movements in the past, Afghanistan’s status as a nonaligned nation made intervention unacceptable. Soviet control of petroleum in the Persian Gulf would be an ominous development for the United States and its allies, for the region encompassed the source of two thirds of the world’s exportable oil. Brzezinski believed that the Soviets harbored ambitions to advance communism further into the Middle East, perhaps into Iran, Yemen, Pakistan and Turkey; inevitably excluding the United States from the region. The probability of nuclear warfare felt substantial and a reduction of arms was no longer a primary concern. Indeed, Carter asked the Senate to hold its consideration of SALT II and he recalled the US ambassador from Moscow. Carter immediately reduced all ties with the Soviet Union, cutting trade, placing an embargo on grain sales, limiting Soviet fishing rights off American shores, and increasing military assistance to neighboring Pakistan. As Leffler declares, “The Carter doctrine was born, containment revived, and the Cold War resurrected.” Afghanistan was a truly portentous moment, as the state of the Cold War had not been this unfavorable since the Cuban missile crisis. With the invasion of Afghanistan, Brezhnev destroyed détente, a policy he had been integral in initiating a decade earlier.
Richard Nixon, the first president to visit Moscow, is kindly greeted by Leonid Brezhnev.
In Melvyn Leffler’s For the Soul of Mankind, he expounds on Brezhnev’s devotion to détente. Brezhnev’s primary policy objective was to end the arms race, and he worked energetically to forge personal ties with American politicians. Beyond eliminating the prospect of nuclear war, Brezhnev hoped to encourage trade, as a frustrated Soviet constituency demanded access to Western technology and resources. American and Soviet delegation met in Helsinki, Finland in 1969 to discuss restraining the arms race,
initiating the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The SALT I agreement held each nation to a fixed amount of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles for five years with the intention of achieving parity. Negotiations waged on for three years and neither party was entirely satisfied with the final agreement signed in May of 1972; yet SALT I symbolized a posture of respect between the superpowers. Nixon and Brezhnev both hoped to normalize relations, and Leffler portrays the personal relationship between the men as fundamental to the signing of SALT I.
Two years later, Brezhnev worked to cultivate a similar bond with Gerald Ford. At a summit in Vladivostok, the parties designed a framework for SALT II, hoping to craft a more permanent agreement. Engaging the new president, Brezhnev insisted, “Let us speak not as diplomats, but as human beings. Both of you and I fought in World War II. That war was child’s play as compared to nuclear war.” Indeed, Leffler draws on Ford’s memoir to recall the president’s satisfaction with Brezhnev: “I was euphoric. This gives me great hope that in the future we will be able to develop détente and do what I
believe both our countries need.” In July of 1975, Brezhnev and Ford collaborated again as they called on thirty-five nations for an international summit in Helsinki. In addition to discussing borders and human rights, the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act vowed to aim for peace between the eastern and western blocs, and work towards a reduction of arms in the future. To be sure, some criticized Ford at home for bowing to Soviet demands, and the international situation would prove difficult for the ratification of SALT II. Still, a common fear of war prompted a significant conversation for peace.
Ford’s address at the Helsinki accords
However, this fear was imbued with a paranoia that constantly threatened détente. As Soviet and American politicians harbored suspicions of one another’s motivations, a climate of mistrust fueled the conflict. Advisors on both sides insisted on vigilance. The shame of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis loomed large in the minds of Soviet advisors, as did hostility towards American expansion into Southeast Asia. Between 1965 and 1970, Soviet defense spending increased by more than a third, and military advisors pushed for further escalation throughout the decade. Americans felt similarly threatened by Soviet aggression. As the 1973 ceasefire led to the Northern Vietnamese takeover in 1975, the United States was in a position of particular vulnerability; it was clear that America could no longer control events across the globe. Furthermore, the disgrace of Watergate culminating in President Nixon’s resignation cast doubt on the dominance and reliability of the United States on the world stage. A mentality of fatalism plagued both sides, as the destruction of one superpower over the other, seemed inevitable. Even into the seventies, the trauma and memory of war prompted America to teeter nervously on the brink of peace and international warfare. Still, cooperation through détente was the overriding political ideal and the primary rhetoric of the decade.
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The Toppling of Détente Under Jimmy Carter
Carter and Brezhnev shake hands after signing the SALT II treaty in June 1979, Vienna.
However, Carter’s inflexible commitment to human rights ultimately created tension with Brezhnev that threatened détente. While Carter and Brezhnev signed SALT II in 1979, the treaty was never ratified. Indeed, American standards for ‘human rights progress’ were drastically different from Soviet expectations. Brezhnev felt that Carter harped on the Soviet treatment of specific dissidents, and ignored progress made in liberalizing the press and granting increased freedom of speech. To Brezhnev, the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which made trade relations contingent on human rights, was nonsensical.
The difficulty of emigration for Soviet Jews was a particular source of contention, as Washington Senator Henry Jackson lobbied for better treatment of Soviet Jews. In response, Soviet politicians pointed to the hypocrisy of racial discrimination in the United States. Americans surely would not be pleased, the Soviets insisted, if detente depended
upon the swift elimination of racism. Furthermore, Soviet officials contended that America’s budding relationship China, hardly a paragon of human rights, was a direct contradiction. Hostility over Carter’s human rights agenda caused détente to stagnate.
Throughout Carter’s term, international circumstances exasperated the Cold War conflict. Despite talk of friendly relations, distrust between the states grew as Americans championed capitalism and Soviets granted aid to socialist causes worldwide. Brezhnev insisted that lending assistance to the Marxist-Leninist revolution in Ethiopia did not jeopardize détente; yet Carter’s advisors viewed the advance as an attempt to control sources of oil in Africa and the Middle East. Carter’s National Security Advisor, Brzezinski, warned the president to take a stand against the Soviet advance into Africa. Indeed, a strong anti-Soviet climate in America caused advisors and citizens alike to charge Carter as insufficiently tough in the face of Communist expansion.
Photos from the Iranian Hostage Crisis
The pinnacle of Carter’s weakness emerged during the Iran hostage crisis in 1979. The Shah of Iran was a longtime ally of the United States, but Carter declared his commitment to nonintervention when unrest and revolution seized the region in 1978. Still, the Shah was permitted to enter the United States for medical attention; a controversial decision that exacerbated turmoil in Iran. Amidst chants of “Death to America,” young Islamic revolutionaries stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, capturing more than sixty American hostages. The hostages were held for over a year, and in fact, they were not released until Carter lost the election to Reagan. Carter’s inability to solve the crisis with his rhetoric of peace was unacceptable to an American public that sought retaliation.
Jimmy Carter on the Iranian Hostage Crisis in 1979. The hostages were not released until hours after Reagan’s inaugural address.
At the same time, a 1978 uprising in Afghanistan provided another opportunity for
Soviet influence as the communist party seized control of Kabul. While Brezhnev vowed nonintervention, the Soviet Union propped up the revolutionary government financially, offering generous economic aid and military supplies. Brezhnev insisted that nonmilitary assistance was not an affront to détente. At the Vienna Summit in 1979, Carter and Brezhnev reiterated their intentions to compete peacefully. Despite the friendly rhetoric, however, aggression was unmistakable from an American perspective. The situation in Afghanistan was compounded by Soviet forces in Cuba, and Soviet support of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. It seemed unlikely that SALT II would be ratified anytime soon, as Soviet and American constituencies remained frustrated by the enemy’s growing power. Observing public opinion polls, Leffler notes that Americans favored SALT, but were unnerved by the Soviet’s escalating strength and discouraged by oil shortages and price increases. Carter’s popularity was dubious, as his approval ratings declined to a mere thirty-three percent in June of 1979.
President speaks on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on January 4, 1980
Thus, when Brezhnev ultimately sent troops to Afghanistan in December of 1979, the move was considered an act of unprecedented aggression. From the Soviet perspective, Brezhnev faced a people whose basic needs could barely be met; the domestic discontent compounded with the perceived threat of NATO’s stationed missiles in Europe led to
Soviet vulnerability, and the consequent decision to invade Afghanistan. Still, to the American people, there was no excuse for the hostile military intervention. After Carter’s ineffective action in the face of Tehran, he had no choice but to take a strong action on the issue of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan: The End of Détentetitle
November 24, 1974 - Brezhnev and Ford share a joke at Vladivostok