Boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games
In the Cold War context the United States found itself in, the threat of an Olympic boycott became another foreign policy instrument used by the U.S. in the hopes of achieving immediate responses and action by the USSR, in a light most favorable to US interests. With the 1980 Summer Olympics fast approaching, American sentiment before the USSR invasion of Afghanistan was already shifting towards boycotting the games. The decision for the games to be held in Moscow was abhorrent in the eyes of many Americans. For the Olympics, such a symbolic event of world cooperation, friendly competition, peace and freedom, would be juxtaposed with a society whose policies and actions fundamentally contrasted these ideals. As a result, in 1977 two members of the US House of Representatives introduced a resolution calling for a boycott, and in 1978 two US Congressmen were interviewed about boycotting the Olympics as a result of the Soviet treatment of dissidents and anti-Semitic policies. It was not until direct Soviet aggression however, that instilled a broad boycott consensus.
The Decision: Boycotting the 1980 Olympics
Carter decided to boycott the Olympics because he truly did see the invasion as a threat. He claimed that he was doing it to defend human rights and to protect US security. He found general support in the idea of boycotting the Olympics; support he wanted to ride into the upcoming election season. He initially hoped that warnings of a boycott would force the USSR to remove troops. When this did not happen, he launched an aggressive campaign to try to move or cancel the games, yet this was met with resistance from the International Olympic Committee. In the end he worked domestically to ensure the US
would not send athletes, and then worked to amass international support to try to ruin the Moscow Olympics. But time between the invasion and the Olympics lessened the extent to which other countries would join in support, which was compounded by the Administration’s inability to effectively pitch the necessity of boycotting the games. In reality Carter miscalculated from the very beginning, however his courses of action had
some dire consequences.
(AUDIO) President Carter calls for boycott of 1980 Summer Olympics
While there was enormous support at the time, there were those who were vehemently against the boycott because they personally suffered from the policy move. The US Olympians couldn’t see how boycotting the games would affect the USSR or how it would ensure troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. Many of them would lose their shot they had been training years for; some would never have the opportunity to participate ever again. Several conceded that if this was in the best interest for the country then this was the acceptable action, however it was far from ideal. The sentiment was really phrased no better than Olympic Athlete Jane Frederick’s statement: “I must accept the inescapable conclusion: I am a pawn.” (Guttman 561). And unfortunately the issue was out of their hands.
American business interests were also very tied to the Olympics and were negatively impacted by the decision. About 501 companies were impacted and forwent potential revenue due to the boycott. Companies such as Miller Brewing Company, Gillette, Levi Strauss and Coca Cola were very much a part of the games. Levi Strauss had agreed to make Soviet clothing and had to or else they would have been exposed to a civil action lawsuit. Coca Cola, while agreeing to the boycott, had excess surplus in Russia. They could not stop the distribution of this at the games however. NBC had acquired rights to broadcast the games in the US and it lost opportunities while waiting to figure out if the boycott would happen or not. The US government also used the Export Administration Act to prohibit NBC from continuing payment to the USSR. US business interests were hurt, and the US government couldn’t completely curtail USSR use of American products in the games.
As domestic efforts by the US over instituting the boycott congealed, international support ebbed and flowed. In speaking in such rhetoric and in responding to the Soviet aggression with a boycott, the US hoped to spur other nations into following suit with them. However there was a mixed international consensus over what to do. The US sent Muhammad Ali to represent the US in Africa to build public support for the boycott. And yet this was a mistake as the White House overrated his diplomacy abilities. Carter tried to persuade allies, but was pretty unconvincing on the whole, and there was ultimately too much time between the invasion and the games, which had the effect of “softening perceptions of the invasion and relaxed the degree of concern” (Sarantakes 193). Both Britain and Australia had been in support of the boycott, but their Olympic Committees wound up sending athletes to the games. France, Italy, Spain, India and New Zealand all went to the games. The International Olympic Committee also worked hard to ensure that the games remained on, as they appealed to nations to send their athletes. It is important to note that the USSR was not really worried about the boycott throughout this. On the other hand, Canada, West Germany, Norway, Chile, Japan, Turkey and China boycotted the games. While the US had hoped a boycott by West Germany would have a bandwagon effect in Europe, this was obviously not the case. In all, 62 nations joined the boycott and 81 participated in the games (Guttman).
Some historians question whether the pervasive fear that characterized the Cold War matched a reality of danger. Leffler contends that many American assessments of Soviet motivations for expansion were miscalculated. When Ambassador Dobrynin returned to the states from Moscow, he insisted that the Soviets never contemplated expanding further into the Middle East. Soviet notions of American intentions were similarly skewed; the United States was not eager to ramp up arms production, despite Soviet fears to the contrary. The real threat was limited, for fear was the overriding factor in many Cold War policy decisions.
Consequently, the Olympic boycott did not effectively change Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Soviet troops remained stationed in the region until 1989. The boycott was yet another instance that the Cold War conflict did not come to an end in what Leffler deems, “a history of lost opportunities.” Still, public approval of the boycott indicates that Americans felt the same palpable fear that drove politicians. According to Allen Guttmann’s assessment of the boycott, a February 1980 poll revealed that an overwhelming 73% of Americans were in favor of the boycott. In the hearts and minds of Americans, the Soviet Union constituted a colossal threat that should be reckoned with as such. In fact, in both the USSR and the U.S., confidence waned. Détente was an interlude in which leaders could handle domestic issues, ease tensions, and avoid nuclear destruction; yet fear always remained. Thus, Leffler believes that détente was never a sustainable arrangement for long-term security. Maintaining détente was a struggle that inevitably collapsed under Carter and Brezhnev.
American and Soviet leaders were aware that endless competition was fruitless. For Brezhnev, maintaining the military-industrial power meant reducing the standard of living to poverty for most of the population. Squandering resources and engaging in faraway conflicts was not in the domestic interest of the Soviet Union or the United States. However, legacies of fear and paranoia led to a cycle of hostility, which the Olympics fell victim to in 1980.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, it was clear, necessitated a strong response by Carter, a man who had been faltering in the eyes of his public. The State Department drew up a paper listing possible courses of action. They quickly dispelled the use of military forces. Boycotting the Olympics was discussed as a way to put pressure on the USSR to withdraw from Afghanistan, albeit the paper asserted that “refusal to participate in the summer games would be too delayed a response, and would hurt American athletes far more than it would affect Soviet policies and actions” (Sarantakes 80). Yet Carter looked over this and spoke about Afghanistan on January 4 to the nation, where he mentioned briefly the prospects of a boycott. As an option, the boycott “was attractively available and relatively inexpensive in political as well as economic terms” (Guttmann). The Carter Administration, having discussed and debated the possibility, was still very much up in the air about what to do however.
It was domestic support from the news media, from the majority of
Americans, and from the Russian dissident Andrei Sakharov that really began to push the boycott as a desirable course of action. Sports columnists of The Washington Post and The New York Times wrote in support of the boycott. The Times ran 29 editorials and columns on the boycott, of which only three were against it. And as Robert Kainer, former Moscow correspondent for The Washington Post, wrote, “an effective boycott of the Games this summer would be a tremendous blow to Soviet prestige; but perhaps more significant, the collapse of this Olympiad would send a genuine shock through Soviet society” (Sarantakes 84). General public sentiment in January 1980 was in support of the boycott, and polls by various newspapers found this to be the case. A Gallup Poll found that 56% in support, 34% opposed, and 10% undecided over the issue of a boycott. This favorable sentiment was the result of a continued anger, fear and desire for action regarding the Soviet invasion. Some believed that the boycott would be a symbolic move that other nations would follow. Others believed that it would actually hurt the USSR economically and internationally, whereas it was also possible that the boycott would just be a strong message to the USSR.
In this framework Carter made his decision that the US would pursue the boycott. He took the message to the American people on January 20th, and issued an ultimatum to the USSR. The USSR would have a month to withdraw from Afghanistan or the Olympic Games should be moved from Moscow, postponed or cancelled. The reaction to this was strong, as Carter correctly perceived and expressed at the time that “neither I nor the American people would support the sending of an American team to Moscow with Soviet invasion troops in Afghanistan” (Sarantakes 95). The U.S. House of Representatives passed a nonbinding resolution, 386 in favor and 12 opposed, approving the decision to boycott Moscow. The U.S. Senate passed a similar measure with a vote of 88 to 4. Despite the executive and legislative support, the decision ultimately rested in the hands of the United States Olympic Committee to determine whether or not the US would be sending athletes to Moscow.
Up to this point, the USOC had really been left in the dark by the Carter Administration. They had not been a part of the debates and discussions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of boycotting the games, even though this committee was central to that very discussion. While the USOC discussed and prodded the very issues at hand for the country and for its athletes, they were essentially squeezed into voting for the boycott. Lloyd Cutler, a member of Carter’s counsel, began contacting corporate donors to hold off payments to the USOC. He also told Congress that they could revoke the USOC’s tax exempt status, strip it of federal land, and amend its federal charter. Carter reminded the committee that the Soviet intervention jeopardized the security of the Persian Gulf, world peace and stability. With still a large majority of public support, with legislative boycott initiatives and with Presidential pressure, many of the leaders felt that they should break even if they weren’t enthusiastic about the decision. The result was a vote of 1604-797 in favor of the boycott. The President of the USOC, Kane, announced, “I am completely satisfied that it was the right decision. At the same time, I am desperately sorry for American athletes who have been hurt by it” (Sarantakes 193).
April 12, 1980 US Boycotts Olympics, ABC News Broadcast
International Boycott Efforts
Muhannad Ali visits Africa to build public support for the boycott
Countries in Blue represent those who decided to boycott the 1980 Olympic in Moscow
Carter's Intention and Impact
Companies such as Coca-Cola lost millions of dollars on advertisements centered on the Olympic
games, such as the 1979 commercial pictured above.
With Carter’s intent and these negative effects, one would hope that the boycott was effective in disrupting the Moscow Games. However the boycott was really a botched attempt. Even though a fair amount of nations boycotted the games, as Sports Illustrated concluded, of the “198 gold medals and 612 total medals awarded in the 1976 Games, the countries competing in Moscow won 152 and 456 respectively,” signifying that most of the countries who won medals in the Olympics were still participating in
Moscow (Sarantakes 228). And while 16 of 80 teams refused to carry their national flag, USSR cameras cut away quickly from them so as to not show this. The USSR also still wound up profiting from the games, and in regards to medal tallies it dominated. The boycott ultimately failed in having any impact on Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, failed to disrupt the Moscow games, would eventually lead to a USSR boycott of the LA
Olympics in 1984, and ultimately it was the final blow to détente in the 80’s over an issue that, frankly, was a regional play and warranted no drastic US action. The boycott was a political strategy that culminated into nothing more than a pathetic symbol of missed opportunity and misguidance, and represented a President becoming too wrapped up in Cold War fervor.
Assessing the Threat